The Complex Implications of Fintech for Financial Inclusion by Hughes, Heather
07_HUGHES_COMPLEX IMPLICATIONS OF FINTECH (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2021 12:39 PM 
 
THE COMPLEX IMPLICATIONS OF 




Emerging financial technologies, or “fintech,” such as cryptocurrencies, 
online mobile banking, crowd funding, blockchain-based transaction platforms, 
and the like, have potential to expand financial inclusion.1 They can create access 
to banking services, investment possibilities, and capital for those currently 
underserved in these regards.2 At the same time, new technologies have the 
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 1.  In keeping with the definitional guidelines of this symposium, “financial inclusion” means 
widespread deposit-account ownership and access to payments services. Steven L. Schwarcz & Theodore 
L. Leonhardt, Scoping and Defining Financial Inclusion, Access to Credit, and Sustainable Finance, 84 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2021, at 1, 5. Relatedly, “access to credit” means availability of 
adequate loan funding on reasonable terms, especially for aspiring entrepreneurs from underserved 
groups. Id. at 9. “Sustainable finance” means continuously providing financial inclusion and access to 
credit. Id. at 10. 
 2.  Recent scholarship discusses the potential, but also concerns, for financial inclusion that fintech 
platforms present, including concerns about biased algorithms that produce discriminatory results and 
about data privacy. See generally Matthew Aaron Chou, Note: What’s in the “Black Box”? Balancing 
Financial Inclusion and Privacy in Digital Consumer Lending, 69 DUKE L.J. 1183 (2020); Adam 
Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 
(2018); Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54 
(2019) (noting the tension between Artificial Intelligence and civil rights); Lauren Kirchner, When 
Discrimination Is Baked Into Algorithms, ATLANTIC (Sept. 6, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
business/archive/2015/09/discrimination-algorithms-disparate-impact/403969 [https://perma.cc/V4JG-
3RMW]; Lizzie R. Hobbs, Facebook’s Libra: The Social Media Giant’s Pursuit of Global Financial 
Inclusion, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. 331 (2020); A. DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT, LEORA KLAPPER, DOROTHE 
SINGER, SANIYA ANSAR & JAKE HESS, WORLD BANK GRP., THE GLOBAL FINDEX DATABASE 2017: 
MEASURING FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND THE FINTECH REVOLUTION 4 (2018), https:// 
globalfindex.worldbank.org [https://perma.cc/B49W-7ZYU]; DOUGLAS W. ARNER, ROSS P. BUCKLEY 
& DIRK A. ZETZSCHE, ALL. FOR FIN. INCLUSION, FINTECH FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL FINANCIAL TRANSFORMATION (2018), https://www.afi-global.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/2018-09/AFI_FinTech_Special%20Report_AW_digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Z3X3-2UG5]; Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk Pricing, 
and Alternative Information 1, 7-17 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 17-17, 2017) https:// 
www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-anddata/publications/working-papers/2017/wp17-17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q77H-QLKT] (noting the potential for alternative data to improve financial 
inclusion); Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currency: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 5 (2013) (statement of Patrick 
Murck, General Counsel, Bitcoin Foundation), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=4cd1ff12-
312d-429f-aa41-1d77034ec5a8 [https://perma.cc/K28L-WPQ8] (“We believe Bitcoin holds out a number 
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potential to aggravate systemic risk.3 For individuals and small businesses, the 
possibilities that emerging fintech platforms create are exciting.4 But, from a 
macro perspective, what are the implications for financial inclusion and 
sustainability of systemic risks that fintech may compound? 
This Article builds upon recent scholarship on fintech, systemic risk, and 
financial regulation by (i) discussing two ways in which blockchain-based market 
activity may elevate systemic risk; (ii) contending that increased systemic risk 
threatens financial inclusion and sustainability; and (iii) arguing that, as 
blockchain-based financial activity evolves, we should not overlook the 
regulatory potential of private-law doctrines and concepts. Other scholars have 
articulated how fintech is poised to undermine the power dynamic between 
public and private actors that originated with the New Deal, presenting a grave 
public policy challenge.5 In engaging this public policy challenge, along with 
considering top-down regulatory options, lawmakers should articulate how 
blockchain-based transactions comport with contract, property, and entity laws. 
Failure to do so could aggravate fintech’s effects on systemic risk. Market 
practices could proliferate despite incoherent or inconsistent legal grounding, 
making it difficult for regulators to enforce longstanding norms that private-law 
rules embody. 
Commentators speculate that extensive market activity will transpire on 
blockchain-enabled platforms. This Article does not take a position on whether 
this is true or how soon developments will materialize. The purpose, here, is to 
consider implications of fintech, given possibilities that technology presents. 
Blockchain-based financial activity has the potential to compound risks to 
market stability. First, it facilitates synthesizing financial assets into obtuse 
financial products, the trading of which can escalate in volume and speed 
seemingly without limit.6 Second, it enables self-executing transactions that may 
 
of powerfully beneficial social and economic outcomes, including global financial inclusion, enhanced 
personal liberty and dignity, improved financial privacy, and a stable money supply for people in 
countries where monetary instability may threaten prosperity and even peace.”); EVA WOLKOWITZ & 
SARAH PARKER, CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, BIG DATA, BIG POTENTIAL: HARNESSING DATA 
TECHNOLOGY FOR THE UNDERSERVED MARKET (2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/cfsi-innovation-
files/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/13062352/Big-Data-Big-Potential-Harnessing-Data-Technology-for-
the-Underserved-Market.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PHS-Z39Y]; Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big 
Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016). 
 3.  See generally Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: FinTech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 
YALE J. ON REG. 735, 790–91 (2019) (arguing that fintech applications may shift the fundamental balance 
of the public and private roles in the financial sector, thus increasing systemic risk); Angela Walch, The 
Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 855–82 (2015); Heather Hughes, Blockchain and the Future of Secured 
Transactions Law, 3 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 21 (2020); Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance, 10 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157 (2020); William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (2018). 
 4.  For example, fintech platforms can provide credit by using artificial intelligence underwriting 
and alternative data. See Christopher K. Odinet, Securitizing Digital Debts, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 477, 490–
94 (2020). 
 5.  Omarova, supra note 3; see infra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
 6.  Omarova, supra note 3. 
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defy private law doctrines and regulatory requirements in ways that are difficult 
to undo.7 Each of these attributes of blockchain-based financial markets 
aggravates systemic risk.8 
Macro-level regulatory concerns presented by emerging platforms for 
financial activity implicate financial inclusion and sustainability. If the financial 
crisis of 2007–2008 is any guide, systemic financial instability can exacerbate the 
wealth gap and ultimately set back groups that, in theory, might have benefitted 
from the greater access to credit associated with market expansion. Financial 
crises hit those who are struggling harder than those who are wealthy, resulting 
in diminished financial inclusion and sustainability. 
With respect to some market practices, we can trace a relationship between 
systemic risk concerns and efforts at financial inclusion for individual investors. 
For example, the expansion of sub-prime mortgage products in the early 2000s 
was intended, at least in theory and in part, to create access to credit to purchase 
homes for people who could not access this market using more traditional 
mortgage products.9 But the secondary market appetite for mortgage-backed 
securities and the rapid origination of higher-risk mortgage products had the 
effect, when markets failed, of further excluding many homeowners whose 
attempts at financial inclusion resulted in foreclosure. 
While individual investor-orientated transactions enabled by blockchain that 
rely on secondary market capital do exist, this Article is not about the connection 
between products designed to increase inclusion but that also contribute to 
systemic risk. Rather, it is about how blockchain-based transactions can 
aggravate systemic risk, and the phenomenon that economic downturns caused 
by excessive systemic risk erode financial inclusion and sustainability. For 
example, Christopher Odinet has observed that consumer and small business-
oriented fintech lending services rely on securitization of these loans (that are 
underwritten with algorithms) to access capital.10 This market activity directly 
links the creation of complex, fintech-based financial products to financial 
services associated with inclusion. But other fintech market practices are not 
 
 7.  See Hughes, supra note 3 (discussing self-executing transactions and private-law norms); Allen, 
supra note 3 (discussing self-executing transactions, algorithmic complexity, and regulatory 
requirements). Blockchain-based market activity also brings operational risk inherent in software and 
decentralization (depending on whether the blockchain is permissioned and how it is administered). See 
Walch, supra note 3. 
 8.  See infra Part II. 
 9.  For example, the George W. Bush administration made explicit the policy objective of 
increasing rates of home ownership among minorities. Subprime mortgage lending enables access to 
credit and is superior in most instances to sale-leaseback or installment sale alternatives to traditional 
mortgage lending. Subprime lending did not necessitate increased predatory lending, the development 
of excessively complex financial products, or sloppy underwriting practices. Yet many home buyers 
ended up in foreclosure for a mix of reasons including misleading lending practices, loss of value to their 
homes due to overall market decline, lack of understanding of loan terms, or changed circumstances. See 
generally, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 83–213 (2011), 
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE52-NPNX]. 
 10.  Odinet, supra note 4. 
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necessarily linked directly to expanding retail products or individual investing. 
Regardless, the consequences of a failure of a systemically significant financial 
institution, or of widespread market failure, do affect individuals and can 
undermine financial inclusion and sustainability. 
Policy makers have been considering for some years now how regulation can 
provide adequate consumer and investor protection in the context of emerging 
fintech platforms without stifling the potential for innovation and financial 
inclusion. Financial regulation to address systemic risk—the soundness of 
systemically significant financial institutions and the like—is often thought of as 
a field apart from investor protection regulation to mitigate risks to consumers 
and small businesses using emerging platforms. But both implicate the question 
of whether and how emerging financial technologies will affect financial inclusion 
and financial sustainability.11 
Part II of this Article describes a specific fintech development: blockchain-
based financial transactions, or smart contracts for trade transactions executed 
on a distributed ledger. This Part describes what is new about this emerging 
financial technology that warrants heightened vigilance from a regulatory 
perspective and how this technology aggravates systemic risk. Part III assesses 
the relationship between systemic risk and financial inclusion. The potential for 
blockchain technology to expand financial inclusion is tremendous, but the 
macro-level financial concerns that this technology presents have complex 
implications for financial inclusion and sustainability. Part IV discusses 
regulation of market activity on emerging platforms, focusing on the importance 
of private-law rules. Private-law doctrines and concepts contribute to systemic 
stability in important ways that policymakers sometimes overlook.12 For 
example, the limitations on freedom of contract imposed by the property concept 
of numerus clausus13 prevent market actors from circumventing various 
regulatory requirements.14 Blockchain-based smart contracts can conflate 
contract and property-law functions and can make security interests and entities 
indistinguishable.15 How do we ensure that private-law norms that contribute to 
 
 11.  In addition, these fields are linked in contexts where practices like securitization involve 
consumer or small business loans. See Odinet, supra note 4 at 485 (showing “how fintech is causing a 
major convergence between policies associated with consumer protection (licensing, disclosures, fairness, 
etc.) on the one hand and those dealing with commercial and corporate finance (i.e., the capital markets, 
risk, and failure) on the other”); Erik F. Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the Link Between Consumer 
Financial Protection and Systemic Risk, 4 FLA. INT’L U.L. REV., 435, 436 (2009) (observing the often-
overlooked connection between “regulations designed to protect consumers and regulations intended to 
protect financial markets from the collapse of financial institutions”). 
 12.  See Heather Hughes, Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, and the Private Law, 20 
STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 179, 210–19 (2015) [hereinafter Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, 
and the Private Law]. 
 13.  Numerus clausus is the principle that the law will only enforce an interest as a property right—
rather than a contract right—if it conforms to a limited number of generally accepted and standardized 
forms. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 3–4 (2000); see also infra text accompanying notes 64–67. 
 14.  Hughes, supra note 12, at 211–16. 
 15.  See Hughes, supra note 3, at 17–23. 
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systemic stability persist in fintech-enabled markets? How do we establish a 
functional relationship between private market activity and collective welfare? 
How we approach these broad, normative questions will determine whether 
fintech developments yield greater financial inclusion and sustainability, or the 
potential for worsening inequality and instability. 
II 
FINTECH AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES 
The term fintech refers generally to technologies for financial services and 
transactions and includes a variety of platforms and developments. 
Developments in technology have at numerous junctures impacted financial 
transactions and services. As legal scholars Chris Brummer and Yesha Yadav 
state, contemporary fintech departs from past developments in that it “generally 
(i) relies on the use of big data; (ii) involves complex algorithms and artificial 
intelligence; and (iii) showcases a tendency to seek out disintermediation in 
traditional financial services and supply chains by a nontraditional set of firms.”16 
This Article will focus primarily on one emerging financial technology: the 
use of blockchain-based smart contracts for financial transactions. Blockchain 
and smart contracts are distinct technologies that can function apart from each 
other. It is the use of blockchain platforms for the expression and execution of 
smart contracts that presents wide-ranging possibilities for financial markets. It 
is this financial technology that promises lower-cost, faster settlements in 
financial markets—offering the potential for lower costs of capital that can foster 
financial inclusion but also the potential for aggravated systemic risk. 
A blockchain is a distributed ledger that records transactions.17 When a ledger 
is distributed, it means that there is no master copy: any participant may maintain 
a copy of the ledger and yet all participants have confidence that theirs matches 
all other copies.18 Participants can trust the accuracy of a ledger without reference 
to a master copy or central authority; this is the innovation of blockchain 
 
 16.  Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2019), 
at n.18. 
 17.  All blockchains are distributed ledgers, but not all distributed ledgers fit neatly into the category 
“blockchain.” The Corda system for transactions among regulated financial institutions, for example, is 
a distributed ledger that uses a data structure that is distinct from a blockchain. See Richard Gendal 
Brown, Introducing R3 Corda™: A Distributed Ledger Designed for Financial Services, GENDAL.ME 
(Apr. 5, 2016), https://gendal.me/2016/04/05/introducing-r3-corda-a-distributed-ledger-designed-for-
financial-services [https://perma.cc/674Y-D4ZW]. Despite its distinct data structure, commentators call 
the R3 financial services consortium a “blockchain firm” and include it in the discussions of blockchain 
technology. Walch notes that some have called expansive uses of the term blockchain “chainwashing”—
using the word “blockchain” because of its market hype in contexts where “distributed ledger” would be 
more accurate. See Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV. BANKING 
& FIN. L. 713, 727 (2017). A member of the R3 consortium has called out this “chainwashing” in contexts 
where companies either do not actually use blockchain technology, or do not need to use it to best serve 
their customers. See id.; Tim Swanson, Chainwashing, GREAT WALL NUMBERS (Feb. 13, 2017), 
https://www.ofnumbers.com/2017/02/13/chainwashing [https://perma.cc/7CFB-Z9U7]. 
 18.  Kevin Werbach, Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law, 33 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 
488, 500 (2018). 
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technology. People commonly refer to blockchain technology, blockchains, or the 
blockchain.19 Or, they refer to distributed ledger technology (DLT), or shared 
ledgers or consensus ledgers.20 Some commentators assert that the term 
blockchain should refer only to public or permissionless ledgers, while others use 
blockchain to mean any distributed ledger—open access or permissioned.21 All 
blockchains are constituted by (i) a ledger,22 (ii) a network,23 and (iii) consensus,24 
that is (iv) unalterable by feasible means.25 This Article uses the term blockchain 
to refer to any platform constituted by these essential elements, regardless of 
whether is it permissioned or fully decentralized. 
Smart contracts are agreements that are self-executing and self-enforcing, 
expressed in code.26 Different forms of blockchain-based smart contract 
 
 19.  While currently there are numerous blockchains in operation, it is possible that in the future 
there will be only one blockchain of consequence. Id., at 501. When commentators use “the blockchain,” 
in some contexts it seems they are assuming such an outcome and referring to “the blockchain” as we 
refer to “the Internet.” In other contexts, “the blockchain” means the Bitcoin blockchain specifically, 
since Bitcoin is the dominant platform. Werbach notes: “Bitcoin today remains the biggest platform in 
terms of market capitalization of tokens, but its dominance appears to be waning. In twenty years, it 
could be worth several trillion dollars, or zero.” Id. 
 20.  People use the word “blockchain” inconsistently, making the terminology surrounding this 
technology highly confusing. See Walch, supra note 17, at 718 (describing the inconsistent and misleading 
vocabulary surrounding blockchain and how the resulting confusion can affect regulation). The terms 
blockchain and distributed ledger are not necessarily interchangeable. Commentators refer to a 
“consensus ledger” as a ledger that does not keep track of a history of transactions but rather operates 
according to a consensus generated on a ledger of accounts that is updated with new transactions at each 
validation round. See id. at 719–20; Andrea Pinna & Wiebe Ruttenberg, Distributed Ledger Technology 
in Securities post-Trading, 9 (European Cent. Bank, Occasional Paper No. 172, Apr. 2016), https:// 
www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbop172.en.pdf; Sebastien Meunier, Blockchain Technology—a 
Very Special Kind of Distributed Database, MEDIUM (Dec. 29, 2016), https://medium.com/@sbmeunier/ 
blockchain-technology-a-very-special-kind-of-distributed-database-e63d00781118 [https://perma.cc/ 
AN44-3KBU] (describing the iterations of distributed ledger technology, including blockchain). 
 21.  Walch, supra note 17, at 725. 
 22.  “The ledger is the database that expands as it incorporates approved transactions. Transactions 
are added to the ledger using cryptographic signatures and keys, and they are grouped into blocks. Each 
block contains a cryptographic hash to the previous block, keeping the blocks in order.” Hughes, supra 
note 3, at 31. 
 23.  “The network is the computer nodes running the software for the application—for example, the 
nodes running the Bitcoin software, connected in a peer-to-peer network—where each node maintains a 
complete copy of the blockchain.  Each new transaction is broadcast to all nodes in the network.  The 
nodes add new blocks to the blockchain as transactions are validated.” Id. at 32. 
 24.  Consensus is how blockchains establish trust among untrustworthy participants in the absence 
of a centralized authority or enforcement mechanism. On the Bitcoin network, for example, consensus is 
generated with a process called mining. This consensus mechanism first executed by the Bitcoin 
blockchain is commonly called “proof-of-work,” or creating consensus with a “proof-of-work algorithm.” 
Many permissionless and some permissioned blockchains rely on proof-of-work algorithms. These 
require considerable computing power (and energy) for their administration.  Permissioned blockchains 
may use a consensus mechanism other than proof-of-work. Hyperledger Fabric, for example, provides a 
number of consensus algorithms available to participants who use a Hyperledger platform. The difficulty 
of these algorithms, and the computational power they demand, varies. See id. at 32–33. 
 25.  No one can alter a transaction once it is approved because the blocks are linked in a sequence 
that cannot be feasibly altered. See id. at 31. 
 26.  See Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts ex Machina, 67 Duke L.J. 313, 313 n.2, 319–20 
(2017). There are other definitions of smart contracts. Max Raskin defines them as “agreements wherein 
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accomplish different ends. The smart contracts that this Article focuses on are 
single smart contracts for trade transactions, executed on a decentralized ledger. 
They reflect a “decentralized bond between two or more parties on the 
blockchain,” that operates in response to financial incentives.27 
Blockchain-based smart contracts, as a platform for financial markets, can 
compound risks to market stability. In recent scholarship Saule Omarova 
identifies a prevailing narrative around fintech: that it makes transactions easier 
and cheaper, through applied information science, in a normatively neutral way.28 
She challenges this narrative, asserting that fintech is a macro-level phenomenon 
with normative and political implications. In a similar vein, Hilary Allen 
identifies macro-level regulatory concerns surrounding fintech and discusses the 
importance of ethics in the administration of tech-driven markets.29 
Omarova states that fintech is poised to be “the catalyst for a potentially 
decisive shift in the underlying public-private balance of powers, competencies, 
and roles in the financial system.”30 This underlying balance of powers in the U.S. 
financial system has been formed, over time, in terms of what Omarova calls the 
“New Deal settlement”: a system of financial sector regulation that took shape 
during the New Deal era and the essential premises of which have been replicated 
and perpetuated in sophisticated regulatory infrastructure for systematic 
oversight of financial markets.31 The New Deal settlement embodies normative 
judgments about the correct balance between private freedom and public control 
in financial markets: 
[P]rivate market actors retain control over substantive decisions on how to allocate 
financial capital to various productive uses—and thus the power to determine the 
overall volume and structure of financial claims in the system. The public . . . bears the 
primary responsibility for maintaining the overall stability of the financial system . . . . 
 
execution is automated, usually by computers.” Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 
1 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 305, 306 (2017). Jeremy Sklaroff states that “[s]mart contracts are decentralized 
agreements built in computer code and stored on a blockchain.” Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Comment, Smart 
Contracts and The Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 263 (2017). See also Ai Deng, Smart 
Contracts and Blockchains: Steroid for Collusion? 1 (Sept. 11, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3187010 
[https://perma.cc/4T44-7VSP]; Christopher D. Clack Vikram A. Bakshi & Lee Braine, Smart Contract 
Templates: Foundations, Design Landscape and Research Directions 2 (Aug. 4, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.00771.pdf (“A smart contract is an automatable and enforceable 
agreement. Automatable by computer, although some parts may require human input and control. 
Enforceable by either legal enforcement of rights and obligations or tamper-proof execution.”); 
Alexander Savelyev, Contract Law 2.0: “Smart” Contracts as the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract 
Law 7 (Nat’l Res. U. Higher Sch. of Econs., Paper No. WP BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2885241 [https://perma.cc/M84X-UD42] (“Smart contract is an agreement whose execution is 
automated.”). 
 27.  JP Buntinx, What is a DApp?, MERKLE, https://themerkle.com/what-is-a-dapp [https://perma.cc/ 
DV9G-P8GJ] (last updated Jan. 19, 2017). 
 28.  Omarova, supra note 3. 
 29.  See generally Allen, supra note 3, at 174–95, 202 (discussing various “potential threats to 
financial stability” from algorithmic finance, including ethical concerns surrounding artificial intelligence 
and machine learning). 
 30.  Omarova, supra note 3 at 735. 
 31.  See id. at 746–54. 
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[R]egulation constrains market participants’ ability to generate excessive system-wide 
risks in pursuit of private profits.32 
This New Deal settlement embodies a contestable, unstable boundary between 
public and private that has been continuously renegotiated as market actors press 
for expanded freedoms to create and trade financial claims. 
The fact that the financial system’s center of gravity has shifted from primary 
to secondary markets, coupled with excessive risk generation and untethered 
growth within secondary markets, has undermined the New Deal settlement.33 
The advent of blockchain-based platforms for financial markets threatens to 
further diminish it, leaving no sense of how, in the future, we will achieve a 
functional balance of private risk-taking and public welfare.34 This is because 
blockchain-based platforms enable increasingly complex “pooling and layering 
of claims, and acceleration and compression of trades”—the mechanisms with 
which market actors achieve continuous synthesizing of tradable financial assets 
and increasing volume and speed of trading activity.35 In the face of proliferating 
private market activity of this nature, the public side of the New Deal settlement 
is increasingly challenged to accommodate privately created claims while 
managing systemic risks. Given this dynamic, Omarova argues, fintech—with its 
macro-level financial implications—presents a “public policy challenge of the 
highest order.”36 
In addition to risk associated with increased synthesizing of claims and scaling 
up of trading activity, blockchain-based smart contracts aggravate systemic risk 
by detaching financial transactions from private law rules and norms that 
integrate important policy choices into market activity.37 Blockchain-based 
transactions may defy private law doctrines in ways that are difficult to undo.38 
Blockchain-based smart contracts are a device for transacting, not a type of 
transaction. But this device has a legal effect in that it dedicates assets to specific 
transactional counterparties—it accomplishes asset partitioning.39 Regulators 
and policymakers tend to treat this technology as a new platform for executing 
established forms of transactions. But blockchain-based smart contracts can be 
difficult to fit into existing legal frameworks because their functionality conflates 
contract and property law devices, and mimics both security interests and 
entities.40 As such, emerging platforms enable market actors to exploit the 
difficulty of challenging a transaction’s characterization, enabling them to side-
step statutory boundaries that reflect longstanding political choices. 
 
 32.  Id. at 740. 
 33.  See id. at 756–59. 
 34.  See id. at 790–92. 
 35.  Id. at 741; see generally Allen, supra note 3. 
 36.  Omarova, supra note 3 at 743. 
 37.  See Hughes, supra note at 3, at 3. 
 38.  See id. 
 39.  See id. 
 40.  See id. 
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For example, it may be possible for a fintech-enabled transaction to assign 
assets to a special purpose entity for purposes of securitization with a high degree 
of recourse that, if subject to a characterization challenge, would make the assets 
reachable by the originator’s creditors. In the traditional or low-tech world, 
creditors—potentially employees, suppliers, or tort claimants—would have, 
through the bankruptcy process, a legal point of intervention at which to 
challenge the true-sale status of an assignment for the issuance of asset-backed 
securities. In a fintech-enabled transaction, however, there may be no such legal 
intervention point. The code expressing the transaction may be written to 
automatically transfer assets to the investors in asset-backed securities upon the 
occurrence of an originator bankruptcy. The originator may try to contest and 
eventually undo the disposition, but there is no possibility of an order permitting 
access to the assets pending the determination of their status in private-law 
terms.41 
The narrative around legal treatment of blockchain-based smart contracts 
implies that existing legal infrastructure can accommodate this market activity so 
long as laws are sufficiently technology neutral. As Omarova observes, the 
fintech narrative focuses on concrete, transactional aspects of finance and how 
fintech can provide micro-level “win-wins” within the financial system.42 But 
fintech is introducing new mechanisms for executing transactions—more quickly 
and securely—that the law will recognize and interpret. This narrative obscures 
the complexity of applying established legal doctrines to transactions which can 
(i) defy straightforward legal characterization, and (ii) force transacting parties 
to contest outcomes only after execution, in a remedial posture.43 The cumulative 
effect of this complexity could be markets that expand despite inconsistent or 
incoherent legal status, undermining the capacity to administer, in the future, 
rules designed to curtail problematic risks and externalities.44 
In other words, disregard of private-law rules invites systemic risk. Investors 
in mortgage-backed securities suffered, surrounding the 2007-2008 crisis, from 
uncertainty regarding the legal status of assets collateralizing issuances.45 For 
another example, the market prominence of securities repurchase agreements or 
“repos” led lawmakers to define these agreements as sales despite the fact that 
they function as extensions of credit.46 This sale treatment, based on form and 
regardless of economic substance, helped to catalyze a repo run on banks that 
 
 41.  Cf. In re LTV Steel Co., Inc., 274 B.R. 278, 285–86 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (rejecting a 
creditor’s motion for relief from an interim order permitting originator access to securitized accounts 
receivable). 
 42.  Omarova, supra note 3. 
 43.  See Hughes, supra note 3. 
 44.  See id. 
 45.  See id. at 57. 
 46.  See id. at 58. 
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scholars identify as a central cause of the financial crisis.47 If lawmakers decline 
to articulate how blockchain-based transactions implicate contract, property, and 
entity laws before these transactions become dominant and entrenched, markets 
could defy regulators’ ability to enforce well-established legal norms. 
III 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
The relationship between systemic risk, fintech, and financial inclusion is 
complex. The very real prospects for increasing access to financial services and 
credit for individuals, and access to capital for small businesses, are exciting.48 
This is especially true from a global perspective. But fintech may have ominous 
repercussions49 for financial inclusion if lawmakers do not take seriously the 
macro-level policy questions surrounding financial regulation, and the questions 
surrounding legal treatment of technology-enabled transactions, that emerging 
platforms for financial markets present. If the last financial crisis is any guide, 
excessive systemic risk and resulting market failures undermine financial 
inclusion and sustainability. They most hurt those striving for financial stability 
and upward mobility. 
Older fintech developments—like the software that enables securitization, 
tranches, et cetera—were applied in contexts involving policy choices made 
expressly with financial inclusion in mind (that is, the sub-prime mortgage 
market).50 But the systemic risk and market failure that resulted had the effect of 
exacerbating the wealth gap and undermining financial inclusion and 
sustainability. 
With respect to new fintech developments—such as AI-based underwriting 
of loans—the promise of expanding access to credit by looking beyond traditional 
credit score and income information holds promise for financial inclusion. These 
kinds of loans are funded by capital markets and, because underwriting is 
accomplished with AI and algorithms, they are obtuse.51 It is very difficult for a 
purchaser of securities to assess or have any insight into the underwriting criteria 
for the loans backing the securities.52 In the event that securitization of fintech-
 
 47.  Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 
425, 447–48 (2012) (hypothesizing that the bankruptcy safe harbor for repo transactions aggravated the 
economic downturn). 
 48.  See Odinet, supra note 4. 
 49.  Others have focused on the problematic implications of fintech for financial inclusion as a 
function of discrimination by algorithms coded with or resulting in bias. See supra note 2. Here, the 
concern is distributional effects of market failures due to fintech-based financial activity. 
 50.  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 51.  See Odinet, supra note 4 at 490. 
 52.  See id. at 514 (explaining the difficulty of comprehending the underwriting done with AI because 
of the complexity of the data). 
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based loans expands, the risk that the opacity and complexity of these loans 
present could contribute to systemic risk.53 
The systemic risks that can threaten financial inclusion and sustainability are 
not limited to cases in which financial products derive from access-oriented 
lending activity. This Article concerns systemic risk generally—as related to any 
technology-enabled lowering of costs of capital by synthesizing claims or by 
eliminating characterization challenges. The concern is that the fall-out of 
excessive systemic risk hits harder people who are struggling for access to credit 
or capital for small businesses. 
The point, here, is not to contemplate a trade-off between access-enabling 
fintech developments and increased risk to lower income people associated with 
the possibility of widespread economic downturn. Rather, it is to illustrate the 
multi-faceted implications of fintech for financial inclusion and sustainability. 
IV 
LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETS 
At the heart of this inquiry into the implications of fintech for financial 
inclusion and sustainability is the question of how we conceive of the relationship 
between law and markets. Omarova speaks of a public and private dynamic in 
which private market actors generate financial claims and public agencies 
monitor and control for excessive risks. My own work casts the private  law as the 
legal infrastructure of markets, without which there would be no enforceable 
claims to trade.54 
Referring to financial market dynamics surrounding the pooling and layering 
of financial assets and acceleration and compression of financial transactions, 
Omarova warns: “If (or when?) fintech delivers on its promise to make these 
mechanisms virtually frictionless, thus taking their operation to a qualitatively 
different level, the financial market will completely forsake the frail confines of 
the New Deal settlement. We need to start thinking seriously about what should 
replace it.”55 Erosion of the New Deal settlement implies a waning capacity of 
regulatory agencies to monitor and control private market actors. In response, 
 
 53.  See id. at 515 (discussing how acceptance of AI underwriting, without understanding it, will 
increase risk). 
 54.  See generally Heather Hughes, Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, and the Private 
Law, 20 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 179 (2015) (articulating a shift from a contract-law to a property-law 
framework for regulating transactional complexity after the financial crisis); Heather Hughes, Reforming 
the True-Sale Doctrine, 36 YALE J. ON REG. BULLETIN 51, (2018) [hereinafter, Reforming the True-Sale 
Doctrine] (arguing that state lawmakers should reform true-sale rules to include price in the analysis); 
Heather Hughes, Property and the True-Sale Doctrine, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 870 (2017) [hereinafter 
Property and the True-Sale Doctrine] (mapping arguments about the efficiency of securitization to 
varying formulations of the true-sale doctrine). 
 55.  New Tech v. New Deal, supra note 3, at 793. She has begun to answer her own call in a series of 
articles, on her own and with Bob Hockett. The task of thinking seriously about what will replace the 
public/ private boundaries in a fintech-driven, post New Deal settlement world requires taking up deep 
normative questions about what kinds of finance there should be, and what finance and financial systems 
should do in a republic. 
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Omarova and others tend to focus on fortifying or re-configuring federal 
regulatory bodies and regulatory strategies.56 
But in thinking seriously about what should replace the New Deal settlement, 
we should not overlook the regulatory potential of state laws, especially the 
common law and commercial laws. Lawmakers should not be afraid to define 
new technology-enabled market practices and asset classes in private-law terms. 
While legal concepts will need to evolve to accommodate new practices, leaving 
technologies of legal import beyond private-law classification altogether invites 
a lack of clarity and a problematic dissonance between legal infrastructure and 
market practices. Once certain financial products or practices become too big to 
fail,57 they may defy proper regulatory treatment despite excessive risks.58 This 
Article offers one example of private-law rules that transactions executed using 
blockchain-based smart contracts could thwart, with wide-ranging consequences: 
the rules expressed in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9 governing 
secured transactions. 
“Agreements that market actors do not currently associate with UCC Article 
9, when expressed as smart contracts, behave like secured transactions.”59 For 
example, if a liquidated damages clause in a services contract becomes self-
executing, then the contract partitions assets to satisfy obligations. “Code-based, 
self-executing mechanisms arguably bring any agreement that utilizes them 
within the UCC’s statutory parameters for security interests.”60 At the same time, 
blockchain-based smart contracts can create a “functional convergence of 
security interests and entities.”61 “If blockchain-based smart contracts partition 
assets in ways that are difficult to classify, market actors may proceed on the 
grounds that transactions on a blockchain avoid secured transactions law all 
together.”62 
Secured transactions law expresses numerous policy choices relevant to the 
curtailment of systemic risk. Consider, for example, UCC Article 9’s various rules 
regarding notice and requiring the reasonable disposition of assets upon default. 
If entire markets can use fintech to side-step the UCC’s notice requirements and 
commercial reasonableness standards for disposition of assets, then fintech can 
undermine longstanding policy choices of political significance. How would such 
a development impact systemic risk? 
A joint study group of the American Law Institute (ALI) and Uniform Law 
Commission (ULC) has been meeting to evaluate the UCC and emerging 
 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product 
Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553,1633 (2008) (explaining how courts and lawmakers decline to 
enforce legal doctrines that threaten dominant market practices when doing so would cause upheaval.) 
 58.  See id.; Allen, supra note 3 (arguing that regulators should be involved with algorithmic 
automation now, while they can still have influence). 
 59.  Blockchain and the Future of Secured Transactions Law, supra note 3. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
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technologies. This ALI and ULC effort proceeds with the posture of assessing 
whether the UCC is sufficiently technology neutral. The statute is sufficiently 
technology neutral if current rules can accommodate and do not conflict with 
emerging technology-enabled transactions and practices. The group engages 
normative questions about the desirability of intermediation, or about the 
meaning and purpose of perfection of a security interest, for example. But the 
group, given time constraints and the number of issues to address, does not 
necessarily engage the type of normative, values-driven assessment of law and 
fintech that legal scholars are calling for. Ensuring that the UCC does not impede 
or fail to accommodate emerging technologies is an important step. Waiting for 
market practices to evolve before taking on more difficult and conceptual 
questions, however, runs the risk that market practices will depart from legal 
norms in an irretrievable way.63 
A decade ago, in the wake of the last financial crisis, scholars observed that 
levels of complexity that can exacerbate moral hazard and financial instability 
indicate a disregard for foundational property-law principles.64 If financial 
transactions are creatures of contract alone, then nothing prevents contracting to 
oblivion: creating more and more complex and compounded claims. Contracts 
may be infinitely complex and obtuse, as they are enforceable only by and against 
parties in privity of contract with one another. Property rights, in contrast, are 
enforceable against third parties. As such, numerus clausus is a feature of 
property law systems around the world.65  This concept—”the number is 
closed”—refers to how property law will only enforce interests in property that 
take an established, recognizable form.66 Market actors cannot make up new 
forms of property by contract. If they could, they would contract around 
bankruptcy rules, foreclosure protections, and tax obligations. The scope of a 
property interest is determined by law, based on the intent of the parties as 
evidenced by the economic substance of the deal.67 
It is an example of numerus clausus when a court characterizes a conveyance 
as an assignment of a security interest rather than an outright sale. For another 
example, consider the various, established forms of business entities recognized 
by statute in each state. Scholars have argued for regulation to standardize 
financial products, such as, for example, permitting issuance of new products with 
a “conform or explain” approach.68 This would help preserve the capacity of 
secondary markets to assess and value—and therefore trade—claims more 
readily when markets are volatile. 
 
 63.  See id.; Allen, supra note 3, at 195 (arguing that waiting for proof of risks before addressing them 
through policy can be very costly). 
 64.  See Financial Product Complexity, Moral Hazard, and the Private Law, supra note 12, at 4. 
 65.  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 13. 
 66.  Id. at 4. 
 67.  Property and the True-Sale Doctrine, supra note 54, at 148. 
 68.  See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries¸ 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 
2030 (2010) (describing the benefits of the “conform or explain” approach). 
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Now, consider the implications for market complexity of a transacting 
platform—blockchain-enabled smart contracts—that expresses contractual 
obligations enforceable against third parties. This type of fintech platform 
presents a challenge. If the functions of contract and property law converge, how 
do we sustain the dynamic between freedom of contract and the formalities of 
property law that is integral to the legal administration of markets? Tasking 
various federal regulatory bodies with policing outcomes in blockchain-based 
financial markets, to preserve financial stability, may be crucial. But it is also 
crucial to watch and digest how private-law concepts operate on emerging 
platforms and to tend to the state statues and common law doctrines on which 
market expectations rely. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
To the extent lawmakers wish to preserve existing policy choices, and to forge 
a functional public and private dynamic surrounding financial markets, they must 
be willing to engage with fintech as a phenomenon that presents normative 
questions. To the extent we wish to foster financial inclusion and sustainability, 
we must think critically about how to harness the best of fintech for the provision 
of banking services and access to credit, while protecting against its challenges to 
financial systems. 
 
